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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

“LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD”: RECONSIDERING CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM IN THE WAKE OF ARIZONA FREE
ENTERPRISE

INTRODUCTION
Campaign finance reform and regulation have become areas of increasing
governmental and public interest. This is especially so in an era of heightened
contribution and expenditure amounts. For example, Barack Obama’s
campaign, along with the Democratic National Committee, spent over one
billion dollars from the beginning of 2011 through the election of 2012.1
Meanwhile, the campaign for the President’s Republican opponent, Mitt
Romney, along with the Republican National Committee, spent nearly $850
million.2 And while these figures are shockingly high, they do not take into
account money spent by independent Super PACs, or political action
committees, which spent, in total, more than $600 million in the 2012 election
cycle.3 As the amount of money spent in elections continues to increase, the
Federal government and states have enacted regulations that attempt to stop the
sharp rise in campaign expenditures.4
After the passage of the Federal Elections Campaign Act in 1971,5 there
have been many Court decisions that have provided guidance for modern
campaign finance regulation jurisprudence.6 One thing the decisions seemingly
all have in common is a general avoidance of instituting a so-called “leveling

1. Jeremy Ashkenas, et al., The 2012 Money Race: Compare the Candidates, N.Y. TIMES,
http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/campaign-finance/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
2. Id.
3. Super PACs, OPEN SECRETS: CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.
org/pacs/superpacs.php (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
4. See, e.g., Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2000) (invalidated in part
by Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007) and Davis v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008)); The Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 16–940 (1956) (overturned in part by Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011)).
5. See Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 431(2000).
6. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); Davis, 554
U.S. 724; Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449; Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2005); McConnell v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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the playing field” approach to campaign finance.7 Instead, the decisions have
focused primarily on the Government’s interest in combating corruption.8
Though that interest is a compelling one, this article will question why the
leveling the playing field approach should not be considered as another
compelling state interest.9 Acknowledging this approach as a compelling
interest would allow states and the federal government to curb campaign
spending that continues to grow and that has arguably put the possibilities of
winning a campaign out of reach for many individuals that do not have deep
pockets or connections to wealthy donors.10
This approach to campaign regulation will certainly be met, as it has in
past cases, with arguments concerned with First Amendment free speech
infringements.11 However, as this note will argue, there is room to incorporate
the leveling the playing field approach to campaign finance reform without
stepping outside the bounds of the Constitution.12
By reconsidering this approach to campaign finance reform, this article
will show that the cases that have rejected the idea of leveling the playing
field13 have been off the mark. They have overlooked a possibility that could
lead to a substantial and long-lasting change for campaign finance as well as
for those individuals running for elected office.
Part I of this article looks at the history of campaign finance regulation and
how the leveling approach fits within it. By examining the past cases that have
analyzed states’ attempts to regulate campaign spending, Part I shows that the
debate over how much campaign finance regulation the First Amendment will
allow is not a new one. Part II then examines Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, both the majority decision as well as the
dissent. In Part III, the article criticizes Arizona Free Enterprise and argues,
contrary to what both the majority and the dissent posit, that campaign
expenditure regulations seeking to level the playing field among candidates
7. See infra note 13.
8. See infra note 14.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 190 (2d Cir. 2011).
11. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2818
(2011); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 912–13; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49.
12. See infra Part III.C.
13. See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 (noting that the Court in Buckley rejected the
argument that the Government has an interest in leveling the playing field and the “skyrocketing
cost of political campaigns” could not sustain a government prohibition on expenditures); Davis
v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 741 (2008) (noting that the Court’s prior decisions
“provide no support” for the proposition that limitations on campaign expenditures “level
electoral opportunities for candidates of different personal wealth”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 48–49 (1976) (rejecting as “wholly foreign to the First Amendment” the idea of “equalizing the
relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections” by imposing
expenditure limitations in campaigns).
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should not be seen as infringing upon the First Amendment Free Speech rights
of any candidates. Rather, there is a need for such regulation. Furthermore, this
article argues that there should be a recognized compelling state interest in
leveling the playing field, especially in an era of increasing amounts of money
being spent on political campaigns. The article concludes by reiterating the
probable consequences resulting from Arizona Free Enterprise, and why such
consequences beg for serious reconsideration of current Supreme Court
campaign finance precedent.
I. HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION
In analyzing attempts at campaign finance reform, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly focused on one compelling state interest that would justify
restrictions on campaign contributions or expenditures: limiting corruption or
the appearance of corruption.14 At the same time, however, the Court has
struck down repeated attempts at justifying expenditure limitations by way of
leveling the playing field.15 The dichotomy between these two interests has
been the focus of the Court’s analysis when confronted with a scheme that
seeks to impose some kind of restraint on campaign expenditures.16 And
although the history of cases examining reform favors the former interest, the

14. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2828 (noting that
contribution limitations, “of course, is the primary means” that the Court has upheld to combat
corruption); Davis, 554 U.S. at 740 (mentioning the eradication of corruption or the perception of
corruption as legitimate governmental interests targeted by campaign regulation); McConnell v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 136 (2003) (recognizing the importance of contribution
limits in reducing actual corruption and the public’s confidence in the electoral process through
the appearance of corruption.); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 440–41 (2001) (explaining that limitations on contributions have been
upheld because of their link to political corruption); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to
Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982) (noting that the Court has upheld the “importance of
preventing both the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding
of public confidence in the electoral process through the appearance of corruption.”); Buckley,
424 U.S. at 26 (focusing on the limitation of the “actuality or appearance” of corruption resulting
from large individual campaign contributions).
15. See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 (2010) (noting that the Court in Buckley
rejected the argument that the Government has an interest in leveling the playing field and the
“skyrocketing cost of political campaigns” could not sustain a government prohibition on
expenditures); Davis, 554 U.S. at 741 (noting that the Court’s prior decisions “provide no
support” for the proposition that limitations on campaign expenditures “level electoral
opportunities for candidates of different personal wealth.”); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49 (1976)
(rejecting as “wholly foreign to the First Amendment” the idea of “equalizing the relative ability
of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections” by imposing expenditure
limitations in campaigns).
16. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2824–26; Citizens United,
130 S. Ct. at 904–11; Davis, 554 U.S. at 740–41; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45–49.
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question remains whether there is room left to find the latter interest a
compelling one that can stand alone against constitutional attack.17
A.

“Leveling the Playing Field”

The term “leveling the playing field” has been discussed in a variety of
ways18 since the inception of campaign finance reform measures enacted over
a century ago.19 For much of the first half of the twentieth century, the idea of
“leveling” was considered a piece of a larger reform movement that sought to
root out corruption that could tarnish political elections and the trust of the
electorate in those elections.20 Today, the idea of leveling the playing field is
synonymous with limiting campaign expenditures, in some way, among
competitors in an election.21 Opponents of leveling see it as a way to restrict
the speech of some in order to enhance the speech of others.22 Proponents of
the approach, on the other hand, have repeatedly touted the idea as a way to
restrict “the role of personal wealth in political campaigns”23 and the
“corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth.”24
B.

Early Attempts at Reform

“Leveling the playing field,” as the term is used today, is not a recent
development in campaign finance reform.25 The first laws enacted to combat
electoral corruption came about in the late nineteenth century.26 The driving
17. See infra Part III.
18. Throughout this article I will be using the term “leveling the playing field” as it is
presently used by modern courts that have explicitly discussed the term and the ideals it
propounds.
19. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 930 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Frank Pasquale,
Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 2008 U. ILL. L.
REV. 599, 603.
20. See John R. Bolton, Constitutional Limitations on Restricting Corporate and Union
Political Speech, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 380 (1980); see also Pasquale, supra note 19, at 606.
21. See Ognibene, L.L.C. v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 197–98 (2d Cir. 2011) (Calabresi,
concurring); see also Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2825; Davis, 554
U.S. at 750–52. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976). The dissent saw things much differently. It
found the idea of leveling the playing field advanced the notion that “personal wealth ought to
play a less important role in political campaigns.” Id. at 266 (White, J., dissenting in part).
23. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 266 (White, J., dissenting in part).
24. Austin v. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990).
25. See infra notes 26–48.
26. Pasquale, supra note 19 at 604–05; ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND
THE COURTS: THE MAKING OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW, at xvii (1988) (“The concern
among the electorates of the industrialized nineteenth century was that their elected
representatives might not be the real policymakers, that government might still be controlled by
those who provide campaign funds. It was such concern that, in the 1890s, led several states to
enact disclosure law to provide voters with information on the sources and uses of campaign
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force behind these laws and other laws enacted during this “progressive era”
was a fear that elected officials would become beholden to moneyed interests
if those interests were allowed too much of an influence in campaigns.27 The
first substantial law to regulate campaign financing was the Tillman Act,
enacted in 1907, which focused on corporate contributions to campaigns.28
Subsequent concerns that only wealthy candidates could run for federal office
led to passage of an amendment to that law in 1911 that included an
expenditure limit of $5,000 for candidates for the House of Representatives
and $10,000 for Senatorial candidates, as well as campaign finance disclosure
provisions.29
From 1925 to 1947, three other federal laws were enacted with the goal of
combating money in politics.30 In reaction to the infamous “Teapot Dome”
scandal of the Harding Administration,31 Congress passed new disclosure
provisions in a new Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925.32 Following
enactment of that law, the 1930s saw the enactment of campaign regulations
that limited the influence of government workers on campaigns.33 In 1940,
amendments to the so-called “Hatch Act of 1939,” limited, among other things,
the contributions made by federal employees to $5,000 per person per calendar

contributions. In 1897 four states — Nebraska, Missouri, Tennessee, and Florida . . . prohibited
corporation political contributions.”).
27. See Pasquale, supra note 19, at 604.
28. Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907); see also Pasquale, supra note 19, at 605–06;
Bolton, supra note 20, at 378 (“Congress appeared to agree with Roosevelt by making it unlawful
for any corporation organized pursuant to a federal statute to make money contributions in
connection with federal, state, or local elections; in addition, all corporations were prohibited
from making money contributions in connection with federal elections.”).
29. Act of Aug. 19, 1911, ch. 33, 37 Stat. 25, 25–28; see also Pasquale, supra note 19, at
606.
30. See Pasquale, supra note 19, at 606.
31. MUTCH, supra note 26, at 24 (“In 1921 and 1922 President Warren G. Harding’s
secretary of the interior leased government oil land to private developers; the leases had been
made without competitive bidding and there had been exchanges of money between the secretary
and the developers. One of these developers was Harry F. Sinclair of the Sinclair Oil Corp.,
which had leased Wyoming’s Teapot Dome Oil reserve from the Interior Department. A Senate
committee investigating these transactions, acting on rumors of a link between the Teapot Dome
lease and developers’ contributions to the Republican party, discovered that Sinclair had indeed
given sizeable sums to the GOP.”).
32. Pasquale, supra note 19, at 607; see also MUTCH, supra note 26, at 24–25 (“In final form
the FCPA required political committees active in two or more states to file quarterly financial
reports in nonelection years, the first strengthening of the disclosure law since the addition of
preelection reporting requirements in 1911. But . . . [t]he increasingly strong wording of the law
distracted attention from the fact that it contained no provisions for enforcement.”).
33. Pasquale, supra note 19, at 608.
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year.34 Finally, in 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act limited the campaign activities of
unions.35
Importantly, the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 did not go
unchallenged.36 Shortly after the new prohibitions were enacted, the
government brought suit against the Congress of Industrial Organizations
(CIO) for publishing an editorial supporting a Democratic candidate in a
special congressional election.37 In court, the CIO argued that the act infringed
upon their constitutional rights, and the district court agreed.38
Hearing the case on appeal, the Supreme Court did not directly rule on the
constitutionality of the government regulation.39 However, Justice Rutledge, in
a concurring opinion, introduced what would become the general argument
against any leveling approaches taken by the government.40 Justice Rutledge
recognized the Government’s argument that “large expenditures by unions in
publicizing their official political views bring about an undue, that is
supposedly a disproportionate, sway of electoral sentiment and official
attitudes.”41 In response to this argument, however, Justice Rutledge found that
“any asserted beneficial tendency of restrictions upon expenditures for
publicizing political views, whether of a group or of an individual, is certainly
counterbalanced to some extent by the loss for democratic processes resulting
from the restrictions upon free and full public discussion.”42 He went on to say
that an effect of restricting expenditures “for the publicizing of political
views . . . necessarily deprives the electorate . . . of the advantages of free and
full discussion.”43
The first half of the twentieth century spawned several federal acts that
aimed to limit electoral activities of moneyed interests in federal campaigns.44

34. Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, sec. 4, § 13(a), 54 Stat. 767, 767, 770; see also Bolton,
supra note 20, at 382.
35. Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, sec. 304, § 313, 61 Stat. 136, 159–160 (1947); see also
Pasquale, supra note 19, at 608; MUTCH, supra note 26, at 157. The scope of the prohibitions was
vague, especially to opponents of the bill. When asked about the scope of the prohibitions,
however, Senator Robert A. Taft (R-OH) said that “the source of funds was the criterion —
anything funded from the general treasury” of the union “rather than from money contributed
especially to finance that particular activity” would be prohibited. Id.
36. MUTCH, supra note 26, at 158.
37. Id. The government indicted the CIO and its president for making an unlawful
expenditure in connection with a federal election. Bolton, supra note 20, at 386–87.
38. MUTCH, supra note 26, at 158.
39. Pasquale, supra note 19, at 609.
40. United States v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 143 (1948) (Rutledge, J.,
concurring); see also Pasquale, supra note 19, at 610–11.
41. Cong. of Indus. Org., 335 U.S. at 143 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 144.
44. Pasquale, supra note 19, at 603–11.
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However, it is important to note that none of these pieces of legislation, which
included expenditure limitations, was struck down by the Court for infringing
upon the First Amendment.45 Yet in 1976, with its ruling in Buckley, the Court
set a precedent with an opinion that marked the beginning of the modern
debate over how much campaign finance regulation the Constitution allows.46
C. Buckley v. Valeo
The enactment of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) in 1971
resulted in the seminal Supreme Court case of Buckley v. Valeo.47 In its
opinion, the Supreme Court considered whether limitations on political
election contributions and expenditures were an abridgment of the First
Amendment.48 Importantly, the Court held that money was a form of speech
and reducing or limiting how much a candidate can spend on their election
would be an unnecessary infringement by the government on a candidate’s
right to free speech under the First Amendment.49 The only exception to this
rule, the Court held, would be conditioning “acceptance of public funds on an
agreement by the candidate to abide by specified expenditure limitations.”50 In
an oft-quoted passage from the decision, the Court rejected the idea now
known as leveling the playing field by stating that “the concept that
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment.”51
However, it is important to note that the Court made a distinction between
expenditure limitations and limitations on the amount any one person or group
may contribute to a candidate or political committee.52 According to the Court,
restrictions on contributions, as opposed to expenditures, involved “only a
marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free
45. See, e.g., Cong. Of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. at 120–21. Although this case did not address
the constitutionality of the Taft-Hartley Act, it nonetheless failed to declare limitations on
campaign activity unconstitutional. Id. at 110.
46. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976).
47. Id. at 6.
48. See id. at 13–14 (noting that the “major contribution and expenditure limitations in [The
Federal Elections Campaign] Act prohibit individuals from contributing more than $25,000 in a
single year or more than $1,000 to any single candidate for an election campaign and from
spending more than $1,000 a year ‘relative to a clearly identified candidate.’ Other provisions
restricted a candidate’s use of personal and family resources in his campaign and limit the overall
amount that can be spent by a candidate in campaigning for federal office.”). The Court also
reviewed the Act in an action based upon equal protection, which will not be considered for
purposes of this note. See id. at 11.
49. See id. at 19–20.
50. Id. at 57 n.65.
51. Id. at 48–49.
52. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20–21.
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communication.”53 Thus, the limits placed on campaign contributions were
upheld based on what the Court saw as the “primary purpose” of FECA, which
was to limit corruption or the appearance thereof.54
D. Post-Buckley Cases
After the Buckley decision, there have been many Supreme Court rulings
that charted the course that campaign finance reform jurisprudence has
continued to take.55 It is these cases, together with Buckley, that have allowed
the Roberts Court to view the leveling approach as a constitutional attack
under the First Amendment.56
Throughout the decades following Buckley, the Court continued to view
restrictions on campaign expenditures with caution and heightened scrutiny.57
The closest the Court came to recognizing the legitimacy of any kind of
leveling approach to campaign finance reform was its decision in Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce.58 The Court found a restriction on corporate
campaign expenditures was part of a larger goal of limiting corruption.59
Importantly, it implicitly spoke of a leveling approach by stating that an
expenditure restriction was aimed at limiting “the corrosive and distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth” that are held by large
corporations.60 In its finding, the Court called these effects “a different type of
corruption in the political arena.”61 That is, different than the danger of
“financial quid pro quo” that Buckley held was a basis for a compelling state
53. Id. The Court went further in its distinction between impermissible and permissible
restrictions on campaign speech by stating that while “contributions may result in political
expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the
transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the
contributor.” Id. at 21.
54. Id. at 26.
55. See supra note 6.
56. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2825–26
(2011).
57. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Right to Life, 479 U.S. 238, 263–65 (1986).
The Court narrowed its holding to striking down restrictions on expenditures by a non-profit
ideological advocacy entity. Id. In the spirit of Buckley, however, the Court noted that such
restrictions should be subject to strict scrutiny. See also Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.
v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 608 (1996) (holding that an expenditure limit on an
independent campaign expenditure, not in coordination with any particular candidate, violated the
First Amendment); MONICA YOUN, First Amendment Fault Lines and the Citizens United
Decision, in MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED 95, 106–07
(Monica Youn ed., 2011).
58. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (overruled by Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010)).
59. See id. at 660.
60. Id. at 660.
61. Id.
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interest for campaign regulation.62 The Court went on to say that limitations on
corporate expenditures do not attempt “to equalize the relative influence of
speakers on elections,” but, rather, they ensure “expenditures reflect actual
public support for the political ideas espoused by corporations.”63 The Austin
court treated political expenditures in a manner more consistent with Buckley’s
treatment of campaign contributions, that is, as “low value, proxy speech.”64
This idea was relatively short lived, however, because during Chief Justice
Roberts’ tenure on the Supreme Court, regulations of political expenditures
have been routinely declared unconstitutional, with the First Amendment being
the basis for such rulings.65 The decision that received the most attention was
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,66 which overruled Austin and
invalidated restrictions on independent corporate expenditures spent on
elections.67 Though this decision has been controversial in the history of
campaign finance regulation,68 the Arizona Free Enterprise Court rested its
opinion upon an earlier campaign finance case decided by the Roberts Court.69
E.

Davis v. Federal Election Commission

The most important case to the Arizona Free Enterprise Court was Davis
v. Federal Election Commission.70 The case involved a challenge to the socalled “Millionaire’s Amendment,” which was enacted under the Bipartisan

62. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976).
63. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
64. YOUN, supra note 57, at 108.
65. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (holding that
governmental restrictions on independent corporate expenditures were unconstitutional and no
governmental interest justified limits on the political speech of non-profit or for-profit
corporations); Wis. Right to Life v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 551 U.S. 449, 476–81 (2007)
(holding that regulations pertaining to issue ads during elections are unconstitutional and cannot
be upheld based on an interest in combating corruption or the “corrosive and distorting effects” of
immense aggregations of wealth collected by corporate forms); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230,
236 (2006) (holding that campaign expenditure limits imposed by the state of Vermont were
unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
66. Citizens United, 131 S. Ct. at 876.
67. Id. at 913. See also YOUN, supra note 57, at 95 (noting an arguably dire consequence for
this holding, stating that “the majority’s sweeping endorsement of the First Amendment status of
corporate political expenditures certainly issued an open invitation for . . . a [campaign] spending
blitz.”).
68. See MONICA YOUN, Introduction, in MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION:
BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED, 1, 2, 5 (Monica Youn ed., 2011); James A. Gardner, Anti-Regulatory
Absolutism in the Campaign Arena: Citizens United and the Implied Slippery Slope, 20 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 673, 674–75 (2011).
69. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2818–20
(2011).
70. Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
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Campaign Reform Act of 2002.71 The Millionaire’s Amendment, simply put,
allowed House of Representative candidates whose opponents spent over
$350,000 to raise money at triple the limit, (up to $6,900 per individual
contribution, rather than the normal limit of $2,300)72 while the candidate that
triggered the change in contribution limits was required to raise money at the
normal limit of up to $2,300 per individual contribution.73
The Davis court found the Millionaire’s Amendment imposed “an
unprecedented penalty on any candidate” who chose to use personal funds
toward their campaign and who triggered the lopsided contribution
limitations.74 Notably, the Court distinguished the Millionaire’s Amendment
from the expenditure limitation upheld in Buckley,75 stating that the
Millionaire’s Amendment did not give a choice to a candidate but, rather, it
restricted a candidate’s spending without giving them a choice.76 Thus, because
of the substantial burden the amendment placed on a candidate’s First
Amendment right to free speech, the Court held that the scheme had to be
justified by a “compelling state interest.”77 However, under the facts of the
case, the Court found no compelling interest, which, under Buckley, would be
to eliminate corruption or the perception of corruption.78 Thus, the
Millionaire’s Amendment was found to be unconstitutional.79
F.

Justice Stevens, Dissenting in Part: An Important Note

Importantly, in Davis’ dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens did not see the
Millionaire’s Amendment, or any kind of limitation placed on expenditures as
“offensive” to the First Amendment.80 In his opinion, Buckley was not the right

71. Id. at 729.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 738–39.
75. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
76. Davis, 554 U.S. at 739–40.
77. Id. at 740 (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
256 (1986); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003); Austin v. Mich.
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657–58 (1990); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 500-01 (1985); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 609 (1996) (Colorado I)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 744. The Court rejected the Government’s argument that asymmetrical
contribution limits are justified because they leveled “electoral opportunities for candidates of
different personal wealth.” Id. at 741 (quoting Brief for Appellee at 34, Davis, 554 U.S. 724). The
Court further noted that the argument in favor of leveling electoral opportunities “has ominous
implications because it would permit Congress to arrogate the voter’s authority to evaluate the
strengths of candidates competing for office.” Id. at 742 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791–92).
80. Id. at 752 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
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case to which one should look for guidance on the issue of limitations on
campaign expenditures.81 Echoing similar reasoning he gave in his dissent in
Randall v. Sorrell, Justice Stevens noted that reasonable campaign expenditure
limitations would “free candidates and their staffs from the interminable
burden of fundraising.”82 Also, Justice Stevens saw campaign expenditure
limitations as likely “improving the quality of the exposition of ideas” because,
as in litigation before the Supreme Court, “repetitious arguments are
disfavored and are usually especially unpersuasive.”83 Furthermore, he noted,
“flooding the airwaves with slogans and sound bites may well do more to
obscure the issues than to enlighten listeners.”84
Thus, there has been some fracturing amongst Justices when it comes to
the issue of campaign expenditure limitations, as some, including Justice
Stevens, have argued for a more egalitarian approach to campaign spending.85
Although the jurists that have argued for leveling the playing field have not
been in the majority in the pertinent campaign finance decisions, their opinions
merit recognition.86 As will be addressed later in this article, this is especially
so in the current political climate, which draws criticism for an environment
that seems to breed runaway political spending by candidates and their political
supporters.87
II. ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB’S FREEDOM CLUB PAC V. BENNETT88
In Arizona Free Enterprise, the Supreme Court took another look at a
campaign finance scheme set up by a state.89 Within a complex regulatory

81. See id. at 750–51 (discussing Justice White’s dissent in Buckley and pointing out that
Justice White saw expenditure limitations “not as direct restrictions on speech, but rather as akin
to time, place, and manner regulations” which are constitutional as long as the “purposes they
serve are legitimate and sufficiently substantial.” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 264
(1976) (per curiam)); see also Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 274–81 (2006) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that the holding from Buckley, striking down the expenditure limitations,
“upset a long-established practice”; that money and speech should not be viewed as being the
same; expenditure limitations not only reduce corruption in campaigns, but also provide for equal
access to the political arena as well as free candidates from the “fundraising straightjacket”; and
that the Framers would be in favor of campaign expenditure limitations).
82. Davis, 554 U.S. at 751 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 649 (1996)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 752.
85. See, e.g., id. at 749–57; Randall, 548 U.S. 230, 274–81 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 259 – 66 (White, J., dissenting); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.,
518 U.S. at 649–50 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also infra Part III.C.
86. See infra Part III.C.
87. See infra Part III.B–C.
88. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
89. Id.
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scheme, Arizona attempted to impose a so-called “trigger mechanism” within a
public-funding campaign finance law.90 Although both the majority and dissent
discussed the idea, each failed to give the notion of leveling the playing field
much of a chance.91 The majority decision, authored by Chief Justice Roberts,
dismissed the idea explicitly.92 Meanwhile, the dissent chose only to focus on
the matching funds scheme’s end-goal of limiting corruption as the vehicle for
finding any chance of the law’s constitutionality.93
A.

The Issue of the Public Finance Scheme

The scheme at issue in Arizona Free Enterprise was known as The
Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act, passed by initiative in 1998.94 The Act
set up a public financing system to fund the primary and general election
campaigns of candidates running for state office in Arizona.95 In the system, if
a candidate opted to receive public funding in their campaign, they had to
collect a specified number of five-dollar contributions from Arizona voters as
well as accept certain conditions in order to receive the funding.96 After
accepting these conditions, candidates wishing to participate in the scheme
were granted public funds with which they could run their campaign.97
Though often times the initial allotment of public funds was all the support
the participating candidates may have needed, if certain conditions were met,
publicly funded candidates were given additional matching funds.98 The
matching funds were available in both primary and general elections,99 and
90. Id. at 2814–15.
91. Id. at 2825; id. at 2844 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 2825 (majority opinion).
93. Id. at 2844 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
94. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2813 (majority opinion).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2813–14 (“Publicly funded candidates must agree, among other things, to limit
their expenditure or personal funds to $500, § 16 – 941(A)(2) (West Supp. 2010); participate in at
least one public debate, § 16 – 956(A)(2); adhere to an overall expenditure cap, § 16 – 941(A);
and return all unspent moneys to the State, § 16 – 953.”).
97. Id. at 2814.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 2814 (“In a primary, matching funds are triggered when a privately financed
candidate’s expenditures, combined with the expenditures of independent groups made in support
of the privately financed candidate or in opposition to a publicly financed candidate, exceed the
primary election allotment of state funds to the publicly financed candidate. §§ 16 – 952(A), (C).
During the general election, matching funds are triggered when the amount of money a privately
financed candidate receives in contributions, combined with the expenditures of independent
groups made in support of the privately financed candidate or in opposition to a publicly financed
candidate, exceed the general election allotment of state funds to the publicly financed candidate.
§ 16 – 952(B). A privately financed candidate’s expenditures of his personal funds are counted as
contributions for purposes of calculating matching funds during a general election.”); see also
Citizens Clean Elections Commission, Ariz. Admin. Code § R2–20–133(B)(1)(f) (2009).
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once the matching funds were triggered, the State allocated such funds in
roughly the same manner in both primary and general elections, that is, in a
dollar-for-dollar matching scheme dictated by the money spent by the
privately-financed candidate in the same election.100 The matching funds
provided by the State of Arizona topped out at two times the initially
authorized grant of public funding.101
The petitioners in Arizona Free Enterprise were five past and future
candidates for Arizona state office (four members of the House of
Representatives and the Arizona state treasurer), and two independent groups
that spent money in Arizona state races.102 The petitioners filed suit over the
Arizona campaign finance scheme, claiming the matching funds provision
unconstitutionally penalized their speech and burdened their ability to fully
exercise their First Amendment rights.103
B.

Procedural History

The district court, siding with the petitioners, found the matching funds
provision “constitute[d] a substantial burden” on the speech of privatelyfinanced candidates because it “award[ed] funds” to those candidates’
opponents based on the privately-financed candidate’s speech.104 Therefore,
the court equated the privately-financed candidate's campaign expenditures
with speech.105 Furthermore, the district court held there was “no compelling
interest” being served by the “provision that might justify the burden

100. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2814 (“Once matching funds
are triggered, each additional dollar that a privately financed candidate spends during the primary
results in one dollar in additional state funding to his publicly financed opponent (less a 6 percent
reduction meant to account for fundraising expenses). § 16 – 952(A). During a general election,
every dollar that a candidate receives in contributions — which includes any money of his own
that a candidate spends on his campaign — results in roughly one dollar in additional state
funding to his publicly financed opponent. In an election where a privately funded candidate faces
multiple publicly financed candidates, one dollar raised or spent by a privately financed candidate
results in an almost one dollar increase in public funding to each of the publicly financed
candidates. . . . Spending by independent groups on behalf of a privately funded candidate, or in
opposition to a publicly funded candidate, results in matching funds. § 16 – 952(C). Independent
expenditures made in support of a publicly financed candidate can result in matching funds for
other publicly financed candidates in a race. Ibid. The matching funds provision is not activated,
however, when independent expenditures are made in opposition to a privately financed
candidate.”).
101. Id. at 2814–15.
102. Id. at 2816.
103. Id. It was precisely the fact that the matching funds provision was triggered initially by
candidate expenditures that brought about the challenge to the statute and enabled the Court to
strike down the Arizona law based on First Amendment principles. Id. at 2817–18.
104. Id. at 2816.
105. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2816.
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imposed.”106 Consequently, the district court entered a permanent injunction
against the enforcement of the matching funds provision, but stayed the
implementation of the injunction to allow the State to appeal.107
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, after staying the district court’s
injunction, reversed that court’s holding, finding the matching funds provision
imposed “only a minimal burden on First Amendment rights” because it did
not “actually prevent anyone from speaking in the first place or cap campaign
expenditures.”108 Important to this note, the Ninth Circuit relied only upon an
anti-corruption rationale for upholding the matching funds provision, finding
that it “bears a substantial relation to Arizona’s important interest in reducing
quid pro quo political corruption.”109
The Supreme Court stayed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, vacated that
court’s stay of the district court’s injunction, and, after granting certiorari,
reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.110
C. The Majority Decision
In his analysis of the constitutionality of the Arizona statute, Chief Justice
Roberts first noted that speech uttered during a campaign is subject to strict
scrutiny, meaning that laws wishing to impose restrictions on political speech
must be shown to serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest.111 The Court noted that the petitioners argued that their
spending, or “speech,” was not directly capped by Arizona’s matching funds
provision, but that their political speech was substantially burdened by the state
law in the same way that speech was burdened by the law invalidated in Davis
v. Federal Election Commission.112
The majority compared the Davis decision113 to the case at bar, finding
that, although the penalties imposed under each system were different, the
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510, 513, 525 (9th Cir. 2010)).
109. Id. (quoting McComish, 611 F.3d at 513).
110. Id. at 2816, 2829.
111. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2817.
112. Id. at 2817. By this the petitioners meant that their decision to spend freely in their
campaign was being burdened by the possible monetary gains their opponents could receive as a
result of their spending. See id. at 2817–18.
113. See supra Part I.D. In comparing Arizona’s matching funds scheme to the Millionaire’s
Amendment in Davis, the Court found that, similar to the scheme in Davis, here, the matching
funds provision “impose[d] an unprecedented penalty on any candidate who robustly exercise[d]
his First Amendment rights. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2818
(quoting Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 739 (2008)). The Court went on to imply
that under Arizona’s scheme, “the vigorous exercise of the right to use personal funds to finance
campaign speech” led to “advantages to opponents in the competitive context of electoral
politics.” See id. (quoting Davis, 554 U.S. at 739).
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differences made “the Arizona law more constitutionally problematic, not
less.”114 First, the Court found it problematic that, unlike the law in Davis,
which still made the benefitting candidate responsible for raising their own
funds, here, “the benefit to the publicly financed candidate is the direct and
automatic release of public money.”115 The Court also had a problem with the
“multiplier effect” that was possible under the Arizona law, which meant if the
privately-funded candidate was facing two publicly-funded candidates, each
dollar spent by the former candidate resulted in dollars being provided to the
latter candidates, creating, in effect, two dollars in opposition as a result of one
dollar spent by the privately-funded candidate.116
The Court also recognized two problems with how the Arizona law treated
spending by independent expenditure groups: first, as the majority saw it, even
if the privately-financed candidate chose to spend less than the initial public
financing cap, “any spending by independent expenditure groups to promote
the privately financed candidate’s election—regardless whether such support
was welcome or helpful—could trigger matching funds.”117 The Court further
stated that the money going to the publicly financed candidate as a result of the
independent expenditure groups’ spending “would go directly to the publiclyfunded candidate to use as he saw fit.”118 Due to the nature of the Arizona law
as it pertained to independent expenditure groups, the Court saw the burden on
them as, in the least, comparable and possibly worse than the burden placed on
the privately-financed candidates.119 This was due to the fact that independent
groups could avoid the triggering mechanism only by changing their message
from discussing a candidate or by not speaking at all.120
1. A Substantial Burden Placed on Privately-Funded Candidates
Arizona, in support of the public financing scheme, advanced multiple
arguments for why there was no substantial burden placed on the privatelyfunded candidates by the Arizona law.121 However, the Court found none to be
persuasive.122
First, Arizona argued the Davis decision only pertained to asymmetrical
contribution limits, and therefore that decision could not guide the case before

114. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2818.
115. Id. at 2818–19.
116. Id. at 2819.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2819–20.
121. Id. at 2820. The State of Arizona was joined in the lawsuit by the Clean Elections
Institute and the United States. Id.
122. Id.
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the Court.123 In response, the Court reiterated that the burden on speech
resulting from the Arizona law was more than the burden resulting from the
law at issue in Davis.124
Arizona also argued that the Arizona scheme actually resulted in more
speech by increasing debate over issues of public concern in Arizona elections
and by promoting free and open debate, which the First Amendment was
intended to foster, and, thus, these ideals offset any burden the law might place
on speech.125 However, the Court rejected this argument, finding that “[a]ny
increase in speech resulting from the Arizona law is of one kind and one kind
only — that of publicly financed candidates.”126 The Court explicitly dismissed
the idea that the privately-funded candidates and independent-expenditure
groups experience an increase in free speech by stating that “restriction[s] on
the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication
during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression.”127 Thus, the
Court found that reducing one group’s free speech at the expense of another, or
what the Court called a “beggar-thy-neighbor” approach to free speech, was
“wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”128
The Court also rejected the idea that, due to the matching funds provision,
no candidate or independent-expenditure group was obligated to express a
message they disagreed with or was required by the government to subsidize a
message with which they disagreed.129 Though the Court acknowledged this
argument as “true enough,” it also pointed out that the “direct result” of speech

123. See id.; see also Brief of State Respondents at 26, Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom
Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) (No. 10-238) (“The provision at issue in Davis tied the hands
of self-funded candidates with respect to their efforts to raise funds while releasing opponents
from the same restrictions. The Act’s matching funds provision does not discriminate against any
political actor’s speech, but rather distributes funds for which participating candidates have
qualified based on aggregate activity in a race. It thus neither discriminates on the basis of
identity nor imposes any limitations on political actors.”). See also Brief of Respondent Clean
Elections Institute, Inc. at 22–23, 27–28, Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct.
2806 (2011) (No. 10-238) (“Davis addressed a law, divorced from any public financing program,
that resulted in discriminatory contribution limits being applied to two privately financed
candidates competing against each other in the same race. No similar issue exists here, where
publicly financed and privately financed candidates, far from being similarly situated, voluntarily
occupy separate campaign financing worlds in which different rules necessarily and
constitutionally apply. . . . Under Arizona’s law, there are no “discriminatory” or “asymmetrical”
limits comparable to those in Davis.”).
124. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2820; see also supra notes
114–120.
125. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2820.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2820–21 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976)).
128. Id. at 2821 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49.). This approach to campaign regulation
is also what is commonly known as “leveling the playing field.” See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49.
129. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2821.
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proffered by a privately-financed candidate and independent-expenditure group
is a state-provided monetary subsidy to a “political rival,” and that subsidy
penalized speech more directly than the Millionaire’s Amendment in Davis.130
2. “Leveling the Playing Field” Is Not a Compelling State Interest
Because the Court found there was a substantial burden placed on the
privately-funded candidates’ speech, a “compelling state interest” had to be
present in order for the Court to justify the matching funds provision.131
Important to this analysis was the Court’s consideration of the privatelyfinanced candidates and independent-expenditure groups’ contention that the
Arizona law sought to “level the playing field,”132 rather than combat
corruption or the appearance of corruption.133
In addressing this argument, the Court found “ample support” for the
contention that the matching funds provision sought to “level the playing field”
between the candidates and their resources.134 First, the Court found the
operation of the law, by ensuring campaign financing is “equal, up to three
times the initial public funding allotment,” was the “clearest evidence” of the
end goal of leveling the playing field.135 Also pertinent to its opinion was the
text of the provision itself, which was entitled “Equal funding of
candidates.”136 Further, the Court deemed it important that the Act referred to

130. Id. at 2821–22. The subsidy was not the only fact the Court pointed to in striking down
the Arizona law as overly burdensome on privately-funded candidates. For example, the Court
focused on instances of candidates limiting their fundraising efforts and discouraging groups to
spend in their name in order to avoid the triggering provision. Id. at 2822. Also, the Court
dismissed arguments, put forth by the State in support of the provision, that privately-funded
candidates could choose to “hover” just below the matching-fund provision’s funding limit or to
spend more than the limit, resulting in no burden on their speech. Id. at 2823. In dismissing this
argument, the Court stated “[i]t is clear not only to us but to every other court to have considered
the question after Davis that a candidate or independent group might not spend money if the
direct result of that spending is additional funding to political adversaries.” Id. Lastly, the Court
was not persuaded by Arizona’s argument that the matching-funds provision might have been
more efficient than other forms of public finance, stating that “the First Amendment does not
permit the State to sacrifice speech for efficiency.” Id. at 2824.
131. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2824.
132. Id. at 2824–26.
133. Id. The State argued that the matching funds provision “further[ed] Arizona’s interest in
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.” Id. at 2825 (quoting Brief for Respondent
at 42, 47, Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) (Nos. 10–238, 10–
239); id. at 47.
134. Id.
135. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2825.
136. Id. (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16–952 (2010)).
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the funds, allotted to publicly-funded candidates as a result of the privatelyfunded candidates’ spending, as “equalizing funds.”137
The Court found more evidence of leveling the playing field in the fact
that, in the event the publicly-funded candidates could not be provided with
funds from the State due to a shortage of monies, the law “allow[ed] the
publicly funded candidate to ‘accept private contributions to bring the total
monies received by the candidate’ up to the matching funds amount.”138 The
Court noted it had upheld limiting contributions as a means to combat
corruption in the past,139 and Arizona argued that limitations on contributions
to the publicly-funded candidates eliminated the possibility of quid pro quo
exchanges between private interests and publicly-financed candidates.140
However, the Court found that “when confronted with a choice between
fighting corruption and equalizing speech, the drafters of the matching funds
provision chose the latter.”141
The Court also emphasized it had “repeatedly rejected” the argument that
there was a compelling state interest in leveling the playing field.142 It noted
that “equalizing campaign resources ‘might serve not to equalize the
opportunities of all candidates, but to handicap a candidate who lacked
substantial name recognition or exposure of his views before the start of the
campaign.’”143 Also, importantly, the Court made one final critique of the
leveling the playing field approach. It stated that it can “sound like a good
thing,” but recognized that “in a democracy, campaigning for office is not a
game.”144 Rather, the Court viewed campaigning as a “critically important
form of speech” and noted that the “guiding principle,” when it comes to such
speech, is “freedom — the ‘unfettered interchange of ideas’ — not whatever
the State may view as fair.”145
Thus, the majority completely disavowed the idea of leveling the playing
field, citing multiple cases for this decision.146 Even though Arizona did not
rely on the leveling approach in its argument,147 the Court sided with the
137. Id. (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16–952 (C)(4) & (5) (2010)). The Court also
noted that the regulations implementing the matching funds referred to those funds as “equalizing
funds” as well. Id.
138. Id. (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16–954(F) (2006)).
139. Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23–35, 46–47 (1976)).
140. Id.
141. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2825.
142. Id. at 2825–26 (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904–05
(2010); Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 741 (2008); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 56).
143. Id. at 2826 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57).
144. Id.
145. Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14).
146. Id. at 2825.
147. See Brief of State Respondents at 12–15, Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC,
131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) (No. 10–238); see also Brief of Respondent Clean Elections Institute at
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challengers of the statute, who argued that “electoral opportunities” between
candidates were being leveled because the matching funds provision equalized
candidate “resources and influence.”148
D. Justice Kagan’s Dissent
Justice Kagan, in her dissent, posited the argument that the First
Amendment’s “core purpose” is to “foster a healthy, vibrant political system
full of robust discussion and debate.”149 Thus, Justice Kagan believed the anticorruption statute at issue in this case did not violate the First Amendment, as
it enhanced “the ‘opportunity for free political discussion to the end that
government may be responsive to the will of the people.’”150
59–60, Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) (No. 10–238).
Instead, the State argued that the goal of the matching funds provision was to combat corruption
and the appearance of corruption. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at
2826. The State contended that the provision both directly and indirectly combated corruption
because it “ensur[ed] that enough candidates participate in the State’s public funding system,
which in turn helps combat corruption.” Id. at 2827. However, the Court rejected this argument.
Id. at 2828. It is important to note that the State’s argument here was not based on a loose
foundation. Arizona has had a history of corruption at the state government level. The most
notable scandal was the so-called “AzScam” scandal, which, through an undercover police sting
operation, uncovered state legislators taking thousands of dollars in bribes in agreement to pass
gambling legislation. Brief of State Respondents at 3–4, Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club
PAC, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) (No. 10–238). After the AzScam scandal, a round of state laws
meant to curtail corruption were enacted, but the appearance of corruption, bolstered by a
“seamless interplay between fundraising and lawmaking” in Arizona, persisted. This resulted in
Arizona voters passing the Citizens Clean Elections Act in 1998, which is the statute at issue in
this case. Brief of State Respondents at 4, Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct.
2806 (2011) (No. 10–238).
148. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2824–25.
149. Id. at 2830 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan began her dissent with a rather detailed
hypothetical, relying on the concept of ridding a state of corruption as a legitimate goal of a
public-financing system similar to the one enacted by Arizona. Id. at 2829. Justice Kagan first
described one state that enacts a system of campaign finance reform, which includes measures
previously upheld by the Court, such as capping campaign contributions, requiring disclosure of
substantial donations, and creating an optional public financing program giving candidates a fixed
public subsidy if they refrain from private fundraising. Id. These measures, in her hypothetical, do
not work. The second state she described takes heed of these failures and enacts a public
financing system much like the one Arizona enacted, including, importantly, a public financing
system that candidates choose to participate in because “they will receive sufficient funding to
run competitive races.” Id. Thus, in the second state Kagan described, the voter-enacted program
“carefully adjusts” the money that is given to candidates through a matching funds mechanism
that, as Justice Kagan pointed out, “does not discriminate against any candidate or point of view,
and . . . does not restrict any person’s ability to speak.” Id. She also pointed out that “by providing
resources to many candidates, the program creates more speech and thereby broadens political
debate. . . . The second State rids itself of corruption.” Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club
PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2829.
150. Id. at 2830 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)).
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1. Justice Kagan Discusses Buckley v. Valeo and Possible Problems With
Attempted Campaign Finance Reform
Justice Kagan noted that the history of campaign finance reform has
focused on one key question: “how to prevent massive pools of private money
from corrupting our political system.”151 Thus, to prevent corruption and the
appearance of corruption, citizens have enacted reforms with the goal of
curbing the power of special interests.152 One of these reforms, Justice Kagan
pointed out, has been public financing of elections.153
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court declared the presidential public financing
system constitutional.154 Justice Kagan pointed out that in Buckley, the Court
found that Congress had created the public financing program “for the ‘general
welfare’ — to reduce the deleterious influence of large contributions on our
political process,” and to foster communications between candidates and voters
and to free candidates from the “rigors of fundraising.”155 Also, as Justice
Kagan noted, the Court “reiterated ‘that public financing as a means of
eliminating the improper influence of large private contributions furthers a
significant governmental interest.’”156 Furthermore, the Court upheld the
public financing system against a First Amendment free speech challenge.157 In
so doing, it found “the program did not ‘restrict or censor speech, but rather . . .
used public money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation
in the electoral process.’”158 Thus, the Court gave state and municipal
governments the “green light” to set up public financing schemes resembling
the presidential model.159
Even though she noted the Court had upheld certain public financing
schemes, Justice Kagan pointed out that systems like the one upheld in Buckley
suffer from a “significant weakness.”160 That is, they lack a “mechanism for
setting the subsidy at a level that will give candidates sufficient incentive to
participate, while also conserving public resources.”161 Justice Kagan argued
that, in order for a public financing scheme to be effective in achieving its
goals, it must be voluntary, and candidates will only enter into the system if it
gives them the chance to run competitive races.162 The system, therefore, must

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2831 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976)).
Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 96).
Id.
Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 92–93).
Id.
Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2831 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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fall into a “Goldilocks” zone, not too large of a lump sum, but also not too
small.163 As Justice Kagan stated, it is the difficulty in ex ante predictions of
how much public funding will be necessary to run an effective campaign that
has made an anti-corruption mechanism such as the one implemented by
Arizona desirable to the States.164
2. Justice Kagan’s Response to the Majority’s Take on the Matching
Funds Provision
Justice Kagan then challenged the Majority’s analysis of Arizona’s
matching funds provision.165 She challenged the majority’s opinion that, as she
saw it, attempted to separate the Arizona public funding system from other
speech subsidy systems that have been deemed constitutional.166 In her view,
the majority did this by pointing to the system’s effects on privately-funded
candidates’ speech by either burdening their speech by giving their opponent
an opportunity to respond or by deterring a candidate from speaking in fear of
triggering the matching funds provision.167 However, Justice Kagan argued
that Arizona’s matching funds provision did “nothing remotely resembling a
coercive penalty on privately funded candidates.”168 The State did not “jail
them, fine them, or subject [the privately-funded candidates] to any kind of
lesser disability.”169 The only burden that Arizona’s law placed on a privatelyfunded candidate came by way of a subsidy to the publicly-funded candidate
and the response that subsidy would allow.170 In this case, therefore, the

163. See id. at 2832.
164. See id.
165. Id. at 2833.
166. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2836 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2836–37.
170. Id. at 2837. In Justice Kagan’s opinion, the subsidy to the publicly-financed candidate
produced more, not less, political speech. Id. at 2833. As Justice Kagan saw it, the law imposed
no ceiling on speech, did not prevent a candidate or anyone else from speaking, did not tell
candidates or their supporters how much money they could spend or when they could spend it, or
what they could spend money on. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at
2833 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Rather “[b]y enabling participating candidates to respond to their
opponents’ expression, the statute expand[ed] public debate, in adherence to ‘our tradition that
more speech, not less, is the governing rule.’” Id. at 2834. Justice Kagan also pointed out that
prior cases have made a distinction between speech restrictions and speech subsidies, and by so
doing she noted that state subsidies of speech “by definition and contra the majority, do not
restrict any speech.” Id. In her opinion, the Arizona law did not dictate who received money
based upon their ideas, and, thus, the law did not violate the only First Amendment limitation on
speech subsidies. Id. She also noted that Arizona never denied funds to the privately-funded
candidates, but, rather, they chose to turn down public money while making a “novel” argument:
“that Arizona violated their First Amendment rights by disbursing funds to other speakers even
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majority’s concept of what constitutes a restriction on a candidate’s speech
was, in Justice Kagan’s opinion, “wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”171
In order to rest her opinion on a stronger foundation, Justice Kagan pointed
out other instances where the Court upheld campaign reform laws that placed a
type of burden on privately-funded candidates.172 First, she noted that any
system of public financing, even a lump-sum model like the one upheld in
Buckley, imposes a similar burden on a privately-funded candidates’ speech,
such as the burden the majority fears would come from Arizona’s law.173
Secondly, Justice Kagan pointed out that the Court has upheld laws requiring
disclosure and disclaimer of campaign expenses, even though these laws “will
deter some individuals” from engaging in expressive activity.”174 Thirdly,
Justice Kagan argued that “[a]ny burden that the Arizona law imposes does not
exceed the burden associated with contribution limits,” which, she mentioned,
the Court has “repeatedly upheld.”175 Contribution limits, she stated, “impose
direct quantity restrictions on political communication and association.”176
Therefore, contribution limits “significantly” interfere with First Amendment
interests.177 Such contribution limits, Justice Kagan noted, do not deter or
diminish the effectiveness of expressive activity, but, rather, they “stop it
cold.”178 Yet, the Court has never subjected such limits to “the most stringent
review.”179 Thus, by referring to past precedent upholding such laws and
regulations, that either deter or limit speech, as constitutional, Justice Kagan

though they could have received (but chose to spurn) the same financial assistance.” Id. at 2835
(emphasis in original).
171. Id. at 2837 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976)). Justice Kagan made it a
point to note that the First Amendment does not protect “any person’s, or any candidate’s, ‘right
to be free from vigorous debate.’” Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at
2835 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal.,
475 U.S. 1, 14 (1986) (plurality opinion)). As she saw it, the First Amendment exists so that
debate can occur, “robust, forceful, and contested.” Id.
172. Id. at 2837.
173. Id. By this she meant that, because a privately-funded candidate’s opponent would be
getting more money to spend under a lump-sum model, it could also deter speech by forcing a
candidate, who feared such a sum going to his opponent, to avoid entering a race at all or making
it more likely that the candidate would “choose to speak in different ways — for example, by
eschewing dubious, easy-to-answer charges — because his opponent has the ability to respond.”
Id. at 2838.
174. Id.
175. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2838 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
176. Id. (quoting Buckley 424 U.S. at 18).
177. Id. at 2838–39 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 378 (2000)).
178. Id. at 2837.
179. Id. at 2939 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29–38).
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argued in support of the constitutionality of Arizona’s law in the face of a First
Amendment free speech challenge.180
3. Leveling the Playing Field
After an analysis of why Arizona had a compelling state interest—based
on combating corruption or the appearance of corruption181—in using the
matching funds provision to publicly-finance elections, Justice Kagan turned to
the topic of leveling the playing field.182 Most importantly, she only considered
the prospect of leveling the playing field if it was joined with the state interest

180. Id. Justice Kagan criticized the majority’s reliance on the Davis decision by saying that
the “similarity between Davis and this case matters far less than the differences.” Ariz. Free
Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2839 (Kagan, J., dissenting). The lone similarity,
as she saw it, was that, “[i]n both cases, one candidate’s campaign expenditure triggered . . .
something.” Id. The main difference was that the matching funds provision, in Justice Kagan’s
opinion, was a “non-discriminatory subsidy, of a kind this Court has approved for almost four
decades.” Id. at 2841. This was unlike the “discriminatory speech restriction” that was triggered
by a candidate’s expenditure in Davis. Id. at 2939.
181. Justice Kagan believed that the State of Arizona did indeed have a compelling state
interest, based on past precedent, in implementing the matching funds provision, which was to
combat corruption or the appearance of corruption. Id. at 2841 (citing Davis v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 741 (2008); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Conservative Political
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985)). Furthermore, she believed that public financing of
elections was one way to serve such an interest. Id.
182. See id. at 2843. Before moving on to her discussion of “leveling the playing field” being
joined with a compelling state interest in preventing corruption, Justice Kagan mentioned three
“smoking guns” that, the majority claimed, revealed Arizona’s true interest was to level the
playing field. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2843 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting). First was the fact that the matching funds provision was titled “Equal funding of
candidates” and referred to matching grants as “equalizing funds.” Id. However, Justice Kagan
noted that a synonym for “match” is “equal,” and Arizona used the word “equal” in place of
“match” and the word was meant to describe what the statute did. Id. Secondly, Justice Kagan
examined how the majority pointed to the Act’s allowance of publicly-funded candidates to
accept private contributions if, and only if, Arizona cannot provide the funds it promised for some
reason. Id. at 2844. The majority argued that this showed the State cared more about “leveling”
than about fighting corruption. Id. However, Justice Kagan countered this by stating that this
provision in the law was only meant to assure publicly-funded candidates they would not be “left
in the lurch” if public funds became unavailable. Id. This encouraged candidates to enter into the
public funding system, and thus furthered Arizona’s goal of combating corruption. Ariz. Free
Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2844 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Third, Justice
Kagan mentioned the majority’s point that a footnote in the Clean Elections Commission’s
website once stated the “Act was passed by the people of Arizona . . . to level the playing field.”
Id. This statement was placed on the website in 2011, and Justice Kagan argued that attempting to
say, as, in her opinion, the majority did, that such a statement, written in 2011 by “who-knowswhom,” revealed what “hundreds of thousands of Arizona’s voters sought to do in 1998 when
they enacted the Clean Elections Act by referendum” was strange. Id.
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of eliminating corruption.183 She considered a scenario where a state had two
reasons to pass a statute that affected speech.184 In that scenario, in addition to
eliminating corruption, the state also wanted to “level the playing field.”185 The
former interest was “compelling and may justify restraints on speech,” while
the latter “according to well-established precedent, cannot support such
legislation.”186 But, according to Justice Kagan, the Court has never said a law
restricting speech needed to have two compelling interests and, thus, one is
enough.187 In this case, the compelling interest was the intention to prevent
corruption—therefore, the idea of equalizing campaign speech, in her opinion,
should not have mattered in Arizona Free Enterprise.188
According to Justice Kagan, when it comes to leveling the playing field, if
there is a compelling interest that can be highlighted by a state implementing a
public financing system, then the “hunt for evidence of ‘leveling’ is a waste of
time.”189 But she insinuated that she agreed with, and arguably explicitly
accepted, the idea that a statute resting solely on the interest of leveling the
playing field would not be able to restrict campaign expenditures in a
constitutional manner.190 Unfortunately, Justice Kagan did not challenge the
majority’s outright rejection of leveling the playing field.191 In failing to do so,
she missed an opportunity to question whether leveling the playing field should
be an approach the Court considers a compelling state interest.
III. WHAT IS THE PROBLEM WITH “LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD”?
A.

The Majority and Dissent’s Shortsightedness, and the Consequences of
Arizona Free Enterprise

Chief Justice Roberts found the trigger mechanism in the Arizona law
unconstitutional based on what he saw as an attempt to level the playing
field.192 He viewed the trigger mechanism as a way to “equalize electoral

183. See id. Justice Kagan’s view that equalizing campaign opportunities by way of
expenditure limits is constitutional only if coupled with another compelling interest will be
examined in Part III.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2844 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 2845.
188. Id. Justice Kagan went on to say that “[w]hen a law is otherwise constitutional — when
it either does not restrict speech or rests on an interest sufficient to justify any such restriction —
that is the end of the story.” Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 2844–45.
191. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2845.
192. Id. at 2825–26 (majority opinion).
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opportunities” between candidates.193 However, basing this decision on
similarities drawn between the trigger mechanism in Arizona Free Enterprise
and the Millionaire’s Amendment in Davis is troubling.194 By drawing such an
analogy between a scheme that imposed mandatory contribution limits on one
candidate while increasing the limits of another, and a scheme that merely
subsidized publicly-financed candidates, Chief Justice Roberts went too far in
his reasoning.195
And while Chief Justice Roberts made an interesting comparison between
the two schemes, the comparison, in effect, stretched the Davis logic too
thin.196 As Justice Kagan’s dissent asserted, the differences between the two
schemes greatly outweighed any similarities.197 It is not an exaggeration to
think that, through his decision, the Chief Justice has made it nearly impossible
for future attempts at controlling campaign finance to withstand constitutional
attack if they even remotely display the goal of equalizing opportunities
between candidates.198 If every such attempt is seen as leveling the playing
field and that goal continues to be seen as a “dangerous enterprise” that
“cannot justify burdening protected speech,”199 then the only way to avoid the
rejection of every attempt to enact serious change into the current campaign
finance climate, it seems, would be to find that leveling the playing field is a
compelling state interest. However, the majority in Arizona Free Enterprise
seemed to close the door entirely on this future possibility.200
This is not to say that Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion is entirely
correct. In her opinion, assuming a campaign finance regulation burdens
speech, leveling the playing field cannot stand on its own as a compelling state
interest against constitutional attack.201 By taking this position, Justice Kagan
made it easier for future campaign finance reform measures, similar to the one
enacted in Arizona, to be struck down if they can be de-coupled from an
interest in combating corruption.202 As was shown in the Chief Justice’s
opinion, that position seems to be ground easily gained.203 Thus, by making

193. See id.
194. See id. at 2839–41 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
195. See id.
196. Id. at 2839–40 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
197. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2839.
198. See id. at 2826 (majority opinion) (“‘Leveling the playing field’ can sound like a good
thing. But in a democracy, campaigning for office is not a game. It is a critically important form
of speech. The First Amendment embodies our choice as a Nation that, when it comes to such
speech, the guiding principle is freedom . . . not whatever the State may view as fair.”).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2825–26.
201. Id. at 2844 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 2844–45 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
203. See id. at 2825–26 (majority opinion).
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leveling a secondary interest, one that can only be legitimized if placed in the
shadow of combating corruption, for example, Justice Kagan renders any state
interest in solely leveling the playing field impotent.204 However, as will be
discussed below, a state’s interest in leveling the playing field by reducing the
amount of money all candidates can spend on elections is a compelling,
necessary, and constitutional interest.205
B.

Why Recognizing “Leveling” as a Compelling State Interest is Needed

A troubling realization for campaign finance reform advocates is that the
modern campaign finance system, along with the current campaign finance
jurisprudence, has been unable to put a stop to the massive amounts of money
being spent on campaigns.206 Unless continually rising campaign costs are seen
as beneficial to all citizens in a democracy (both the candidates and the voters),
such costs should lead one to conclude that leveling the playing field, by
finding a way to curb the massive political spending currently prevalent in
high-profile campaigns, is a compelling state interest that serves First
Amendment principles.207
In response to the current campaign finance landscape, numerous authors
have proposed some form of a leveling the playing field approach to campaign
finance reform.208 The proposals range from voucher systems to public

204. See Michael C. Dorf, Who Could Oppose a Level Playing Field? The Supreme Court,
That’s Who, VERDICT (July. 5, 2011), http://verdict.justia.com/2011/07/05/who-could-oppose-alevel-playing-field-the-supreme-court-that%e2%80%99s-who. Professor Dorf notes the
distinction between “leveling up,” or giving more money to less-wealthy candidates to spend on a
level equal to that of wealthier ones, and “leveling down,” or capping the amount a wealthy
candidate may spend on an election. Id. Importantly, he notes that “[u]nfortunately, the current
Supreme Court appears unlikely to change its mind about leveling down. Although the dissenters
in the Arizona case disagreed with the majority about the purpose and effect of the Arizona law,
they too accepted the proposition that leveling down to preserve political equality is not a
compelling interest.” Id.
205. See infra Part III.B–C.
206. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. See also infra note 211 and accompanying
text.
207. See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., Walter M. Frank, Individual Rights and the Political Process: A Proposed
Framework for Democracy Defining Cases, 35 S.U. L. REV. 47, 83 (2007) (mentioning that
public financing of campaigns and mandatory debates are two examples of “other less
constitutionally questionable ways of leveling the electoral playing field to reduce the role of the
wealthy without infringing on their right to make their voices heard); David A. Strauss,
Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1388 (1994)
(mentioning promoting equality by substituting public, tax-raised money for voluntary
expenditures); Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public
Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 21–27 (1996) (proposing a
“voucher plan” that would give individual voters a set amount to contribute to candidates each
election cycle); Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM.
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financing systems similar to the one struck down in Arizona Free
Enterprise.209 There have also been recent calls for a constitutional amendment
to place more regulations on campaign finance, undoing Buckley and its
progeny.210 Reforms that make a substantial change in campaign spending may
be a moving target. But whatever the cost, implementing new approaches to
campaign finance reform to further the interests of the American public, as
well as those candidates that stand to benefit from a more equal playing field
would be a worthy endeavor.211
Furthermore, evidence shows that in the current political climate, where
campaign spending has been rising seemingly uncontrollably,212 an egalitarian
approach to campaign finance reform is ripe for enactment.213 For example, in
Presidential campaigns alone, since 1976, cumulative spending has doubled to

L. REV. 1390, 1411–13 (1994) (proposing an incentive-based plan of public financing of
candidates and, in the alternative, a voter-voucher system for campaign contributions). Notably,
in a chat on the website “Reddit,” President Barack Obama, while not arguing for a leveling
approach per se, advocated for some type of change to current campaign-finance rules. President
Obama, REDDIT (Oct. 4, 2012, 7:51 PM), http://www.reddit.com/user/PresidentObama. He stated
that the “no-holds barred flow of seven and eight figure checks, most undisclosed . . .
fundamentally threaten[s] to overwhelm the political process over the long run and drown out the
voices of ordinary citizens.” Id. The President also argued for the need to pass the Disclose Act,
currently in Congress, that would “at least force disclosure of who is giving to who.” Id. He also
noted that Congress should pass legislation “prohibiting the bundling of campaign contributions
from lobbyists.” Id. Lastly, he wrote that “we need to seriously consider mobilizing a
constitutional amendment process to overturn Citizens United” and that even if that process “falls
short, it can shine a spotlight of the super-PAC phenomenon and help apply pressure for change.”
Id.
209. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
210. Jeremy Paul, Campaign Reform for the 21st Century: Putting Mouth Where the Money Is,
30 CONN. L. REV. 779, 782–84 (1998) (noting that the amendment should require candidates to
appear jointly in front of voters to “express their concerns at regularly scheduled events that occur
in close (but not too close) proximity to the election.”); but see Elizabeth Drew, Can We Have a
Democratic Election?, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 23, 2012, at 46 (describing a constitutional
amendment to allow restrictions on spending in favor of or against a specific candidate as “[t]he
most popular and most wrongheaded proposal” of those created to reform campaign finance).
211. See Dennis F. Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns Safe for
Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1036, 1058, 1068–69 (2005); see also Paul, supra note 210,
at 813.
212. See Eric H. Wexler, A Trigger Too Far?: The Future of Trigger Funding Provisions in
Public Financing After Davis v. FEC, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1141, 1143 (2011); see also Drew,
supra note 210, at 45–46 (pointing out the rise of the “Super PAC” in the wake of Citizen’s
United, resulting in large campaign expenditures by wealthy individuals through Super PACs,
which have spent millions of dollars in support of candidates in the 2012 Republican Primary
race). In his concurring opinion from Buckley v. Valeo, Justice White made a seemingly ominous
prediction by saying “[w]ithout limits on total expenditures, campaign costs will inevitably and
endlessly escalate.” 424 U.S. 1, 264 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
213. See Drew, supra note 210, at 46.
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over one billion dollars in 2008 and eclipsed that number again in the 2012
election.214 Indeed, recent polling suggests that a majority of Americans favor
limiting how much campaigns,215 as well as Political Action Committees, can
spend on an election.216
The current Supreme Court, with its recent rulings favoring a seemingly
unrestricted campaign finance environment,217 no doubt has contributed to
skyrocketing expenditures in campaigns across the country.218 In light of these
developments, it stands to reason that new proposals for campaign finance
reform should be considered, ones that better equalize opportunities for all
candidates and satisfy the public’s desire for change.219 And while states have
experimented with different types of schemes,220 the bottom line is that
recognizing leveling the playing field as a compelling state interest is essential
to making substantial campaign finance reform a reality.

214. Center for Responsible Politics, Presidential Fundraising and Spending, 1976 – 2008,
OPEN SECRETS: CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/totals.
php?cycle= (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). See also supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
215. Megan Thee-Brenan, Americans Want Disclosure and Limits on Campaign Spending,
N.Y. TIMES: THE CAUCUS (Oct. 28, 2010, 4:51 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/
10/28/americans-want-disclosure-and-limits-on-campaign-spending/ (stating that in an October
2010 poll, “nearly 8 in 10 Americans say it is important . . . to limit the amount of money
campaigns can spend”).
216. Brian Montopoli, Poll: Most want limits on campaign spending, CBS NEWS (Jan. 18,
2012, 6:32 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-57361428-503544/poll-most-wantlimits-on-campaign-spending/ (stating that in a January 2012 poll sixty-seven percent of those
polled favored lawfully limiting the amount of money that Political Action Committees could
spend in an election cycle); see also 2012 survey: Public opposes unlimited campaign spending,
FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (Jul. 17, 2012), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/2012-surveypublic-opposes-unlimited-campaign-spending (stating that in a recent poll, when asked whether
corporations and unions should be able to spend as much as they want in support of or in
opposition to political candidates, 63 percent of those polled answer “No,” 30 percent answered
“Yes,” and 7 percent were undecided).
217. See supra Part I.D–II.
218. See e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Decision that Threatens Democracy, N.Y. REV. OF
BOOKS (May 13, 2010), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/may/13/decisionthreatens-democracy/; Timm Herdt, Herdt: High court Embraces the Worst of State Politics,
VENTURA COUNTY STAR (Jan. 26, 2010, 6:29 PM), http://www.vcstar.com/news/2010/jan/26/
high-court-embraces-the-worst-of-state-politics/; see also Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of
Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 217, 219 (2010).
219. See Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 201 (2d Cir. 2011) (Calabresi, concurring); see
Drew, supra note 210, at 46.
220. See e.g., The Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-940
(2011) (overturned in part by Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct.
2806, 2813 (2011)).
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C. Making “Leveling the Playing Field” A Compelling State Interest
The majority and dissenting opinions from Arizona Free Enterprise make
one thing clear: the current Court does not believe that leveling the playing
field should ever stand alone as a constitutionally compelling state interest.221
This idea is predicated on the fact that such an approach necessarily involves
restricting the speech of some for the benefit of others.222 While it may be true
that current precedent agrees with this conclusion,223 it is also true that the
Court has the ability to reverse that trend and overrule prior decisions.224 And
in light of the massive spending occurring in high-profile campaigns across the
country, as well as the mood of the citizenry, the Supreme Court should
consider reversing their current course in campaign finance cases and find
leveling to be a compelling state interest capable of withstanding constitutional
attack on its own and curtailing out-of-control campaign spending.225 Not
doing so will ignore a “variable of critical constitutional importance,” that is,
the ability of all citizens to express their feelings during a campaign, regardless
of the amount of money one has available to spend.226
Whatever the leveling approach may be it will need to overcome First
Amendment free speech concerns that have plagued the leveling approach
since the Buckley decision.227 This can be done, however, if the Court would
consider such an approach as serving First Amendment principles, rather than
abridging them, especially in an era where, in campaigns, money has spoken
louder than words.228

221. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2825–26 (noting that the
Court has “repeatedly rejected the argument that the government has a compelling state interest in
‘leveling the playing field’”); see also id. at 2844.
222. See id. at 2820–21 (stating that even if the matching funds provision increased the
speech of the publicly-funded candidates in Arizona, it would do so only at the “expense of
impermissibly burdening” the speech of the privately-financed candidates and independent
expenditure groups).
223. See supra note 13.
224. See e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010); Fed.
Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 500 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“This Court has not hesitated to overrule decisions offensive to the First Amendment.”).
225. See Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 199–200 (2d Cir. 2011) (Calabresi, concurring);
see also Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, How Congress Can Overrule Citizens United,
THEHUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 8, 2012, 2:11 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bruceackerman/how-congress-can-overrule_b_1263384.html (noting that “[t]he Court should be given
a second-chance to engage in a collaborative effort with the president and Congress to define the
meaning of free speech after confronting the hard truths of American politics.”).
226. See Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 201 (Calabresi, concurring).
227. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976).
228. See Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 197–98 (Calabresi, concurring).
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1. “Leveling” in the Courts: How the Approach Serves the First
Amendment
Jurists have argued, both implicitly and explicitly, that leveling the playing
field serves the First Amendment in a way that should permit it to be deemed a
compelling state interest in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny.229 These
arguments revolve around the idea that leveling avoids gross inequities
amongst speakers’ resources in campaigns and those speakers’ ability to
express their ideas to the same extent as their opponent.230
Perhaps the most explicit example of this argument came from Judge
Calabresi, of the Second Circuit, in his concurrence in Ognibene v. Parkes.231
In his defense of leveling the playing field, or as he also called the approach,
the “antidistortion interest,” he argued that leveling by limiting campaign
expenditures serves the First Amendment in two ways.232 First, the approach
“prevents some speakers from drowning out the speech of others.”233 Second,

229. See infra notes 231–42 and accompanying text.
230. See infra notes 231–42 and accompanying text. Scholars have also noted problems with
the current campaign finance system and, in so doing, implicitly argued for a different approach
that would mitigate the damage done by too much money in campaigns. See, e.g., Dorf, supra
note 204 (implying that leveling is an even more important interest than an anti-corruption
rationale, by stating that leveling seeks to preserve “democracy as a domain in which each citizen
has an equal voice” and “[i]t is hard to imagine an interest more compelling than the interest in
preserving democracy as a domain of political equality[.]”); Fred Wertheimer & Susan W.
Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1126 (1996), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTION AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM: AN ANTHOLOGY 93, 100–01 (Frederick G. Slabach ed., 1998) (deploring the “arms race
mentality” that unlimited spending creates in campaigns); Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the
Widening Gyre of Fund Raising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First
Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1281 (1994), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTION AND
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: AN ANTHOLOGY 215, 219–24, 238–40 (Frederick G. Slabach ed.,
1998) (arguing that spending limits help to reduce the amount of time those candidates will have
to devote to campaign fundraising and noting that exempting personal expenditures from
regulation will only place more of a premium on candidate wealth as a “political credential”);
Ronald Dworkin, Free Speech and the Dimensions of Democracy, in IF BUCKLEY FELL: A FIRST
AMENDMENT BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATING MONEY IN POLITICS 63, 100 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz
ed., 1999); Thompson, supra note 11, at 1058 (noting that it is important to “moderate the
influence of money,” and in order to do so, “we may need to place greater restrictions . . . on the
kinds of activities and communications for which campaign funds may be spent.”); but see
Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance
Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049 (1996), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTION AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM: AN ANTHOLOGY 113, 114 (Frederick G. Slabach ed. 1998) (arguing that scholars
advocating for greater equality have made incorrect assumptions about the political system, and
that campaign finance reform measures actually work to undermine democratic principles of
equality).
231. Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 197 (2d Cir. 2011) (Calabresi, concurring).
232. Id. at 197–98.
233. Id. at 198.
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it “safeguards something of fundamental First Amendment importance — the
ability to have one’s protected expression indicate the intensity of one’s
political beliefs.”234 He went on to state that “there is perhaps no greater a
distortive influence on the intensity of expression than wealth differences.”235
And while such differences in wealth are inevitable, Judge Calabresi argued,
“the only way to ensure a truly ‘unfettered interchange of ideas’— an
interchange, that is, where each voice is heard in reasonable proportion to the
intensity of the beliefs it expresses — is to give the government some freedom
to mitigate the fettering impact of these inequalities.”236
In his concurring opinion in Landell v. Sorrell, Judge Calabresi sounded
similar sentiments of equalizing campaign expenditures by way of
regulation.237 In that opinion, Judge Calabresi posited that a state could have an
interest in giving all candidates and contributors an equal opportunity to
“express intensity of political desire.”238 Importantly, in this context, Calabresi
noted that the idea of leveling the playing field would be a “more fruitful
one . . . were it able to be brought out from under Buckley’s corruption mantle
and into a framework that more honestly reflects the issues at play.”239
Supreme Court Justices have also pointed in the direction of a need for
leveling the playing field to be considered a compelling state interest. In his
concurring opinion in Buckley v Valeo, for example, Justice White noted that
expenditure limitations do not serve an interest in combating corruption, but
they do serve “salutary purposes related to the integrity of federal
campaigns.”240 He continued, saying that by limiting “the importance of
personal wealth,” limitations on campaign expenditures help to “assure that
only individuals with a modicum of support from others will be viable
candidates.”241 Also, in his dissent in Davis, Justice Stevens echoed Justice

234. Id. Judge Calabresi continued his attack on unlimited campaign expenditures through his
“intensity of expression” argument by saying that “where speech takes the form of a monetary
expenditure, the link between intensity of beliefs and intensity of expression, as measured by the
amount contributed, can too easily break down. This is a result of the unequal distribution of
wealth, which makes the amount of money an individual spends on behalf of a political cause an
unreliable measure of the intensity and depth of that individual’s support for the cause.” Id.
235. Id. at 199.
236. Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 200 (Calabresi, concurring).
237. Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2005).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 266 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
241. Id. Justice White also pointed out that the limitations on expenditures tend to “equalize
access to the political arena, encouraging the less wealthy, unable to bankroll their own
campaigns, to run for political office.” Id.
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White’s argument that equalizing electoral opportunities by enacting a leveling
approach in campaigns may serve a compelling state interest.242
2. What “Leveling” As a Compelling State Interest Would Mean for
Campaign Finance Reform
As these jurists argue, the state has a compelling interest in avoiding
inequities between candidates’ abilities to express themselves during
campaigns, and can do so by relying on the idea of leveling the playing
field.243 This effectively would turn the outcome of Arizona Free Enterprise on
its head by viewing leveling as a conduit, rather than a barrier, to First
Amendment free speech principles.244 With an eye cast towards the current
campaign finance climate,245 the idea that leveling abridges the First
Amendment becomes less persuasive.246
As was previously discussed, considering the campaign finance reform
approach of leveling, standing alone, to be an abridgement to First Amendment
rights has helped to enable campaign expenditures to reach unprecedented
heights.247 Such spending has had the unfortunate effect of linking the ability
of candidates to speak freely and powerfully with the amount of money they
have in their pockets.248 To avoid this, it is time to start thinking of “leveling”
as an approach that can help inject First Amendment principles—i.e. the ability
of all candidates, rich or poor, to have their voice heard, no matter the amount
of their campaign resources or the number of connections they have to wealthy
independent spending groups—into the current campaign landscape.249

242. See Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 751 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
see also supra Part I.F. There have been other instances where Supreme Court opinions have
raised an argument that favored the idea of leveling through campaign expenditure limitations.
Though they did not speak as explicitly as Judge Calabresi, the arguments posed nonetheless
point to expenditure limitations as a solution to the problem of too much money being spent in
campaigns for elected office. See e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 274 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that it is time to reconsider Buckley’s stance on limiting campaign
expenditures in order to curb the “pernicious effects of endless fundraising[.]”) Through his
argument, Justice Stevens implied that a leveling approach, one that would equalize resources for
candidates in campaigns, could be recognized as constitutional. Id.
243. See supra notes 230–41 and accompanying text.
244. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2825–26;
id. at 2844 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
245. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text; see also supra note 211 and accompanying
text.
246. See Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 200 (2d Cir. 2011) (Calabresi, concurring).
247. See supra notes 1–3; see also supra note 213 and accompanying text.
248. Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 198 (noting that “[i]f an external factor, such as wealth, allows
some individuals to communicate their political views too powerfully, then persons who lack
wealth may, for all intents and purposes, be excused from the democratic dialogue.”).
249. Id. at 198–99.
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Allowing leveling to be introduced into campaign finance reform as a
compelling state interest will help moderate the “influence of money” and will
“restore a balance in the process so that other resources—political talent, ideas,
and experiences—could be deployed more regularly and more effectively.”250
This would redefine modern campaign finance jurisprudence, which originated
in Buckley.251 Seen in this new light, leveling could be legitimately recognized
as a compelling state interest, as it will help to serve First Amendment
principles as they apply to modern campaigns.252
IV. CONCLUSION
At a time when the political-campaign system has increasingly received
criticism for being and displaying a tendency to be beholden to special
interests and the almighty dollar, serious campaign finance reform should not
be brushed away in fear of limiting what some may see as political speech (i.e.
the amount of money spent on a campaign). Existing limitations on campaign
contributions may do well in helping to shore up inequities in the money
coming into campaigns. However, regulating the money being spent by
campaigns is just as important if campaign finance reform is to be taken
seriously. Instead of favoring an approach that attempts to regulate inequities
in campaign expenditures, Arizona Free Enterprise, in both its majority and
dissenting opinions, continued the work of past decisions by helping to
construct a hurdle that is, and will be, perhaps too high for future campaign
finance regulation to overcome.253
While eliminating the reality or appearance of corruption is and should be
a compelling state interest in limiting campaign expenditures, the Court should
reconsider its approach to the interest of leveling the playing field.254 As long
as the latter interest is not given serious consideration as a compelling one,
there persists a danger that moneyed interests, whether individual or otherwise,
will continue to have a substantial and unfair influence on elections.255
Unfortunately, that danger was not curtailed by the recent decision in Arizona
Free Enterprise.256
Campaign finance reform is not a recent development, yet precedent has
helped to determine which shape it should take.257 Perhaps it is time to

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Thompson, supra note 211, at 1058.
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976).
Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 198–99; see Thompson, supra note 211, at 1058.
See supra Part III.A.
Supra Part III.C.
See Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 199.
See supra Part III.A.
See generally supra Part I.C–I.E.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

520

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII:487

reconsider the mold that has been cast.258 Allowing money to talk louder than
individual voices during campaigns should not become a mainstay in electoral
politics.259 In a democracy, equality, especially as it pertains to campaigning
for elected office, should be an interest recognized as constitutional—as well
as one that is desired, not one that is feared.
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258. See supra Part III.B–III.C.
259. See Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 200–01.

* J.D. Candidate 2013, Saint Louis University School of Law. I would like to
thank Professor Chad Flanders for his guidance during the writing of this article, as
well as everyone who supported me throughout the writing process, including my
wife, Dana Skrabacz.

